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A growing strand of International Relations literature has flourished analyzing what it calls New 
Imperialism (Negri and Hardt 2000; XXX). Despite its label, this literature does not really study empires. 
In this literature, “imperialism” and “imperialist” are not adjectives mechanically derived from “empire” 
which could refer to the ideology of promoting empire or empire building – like “federalism” and 
“federalist” which refer to the ideology promoting a federal state or describe the building a federation. 
New Imperialism is a more or less distant heir to the Marxist tradition in which imperialism is the highest 
stage of capitalism, so it is rooted in an economic theory of domination rather than in a political theory 
of polity building. It is also a very American centered literature in which “imperialism” and “imperialist” 
most often refers to a particular type of foreign policy if not to the foreign policy of the USA in its 
attempt to dominate the world. American centered, because in this literature, when the USA exports 
McDonalds and Coca Cola in the rest of the world, this is presented as a sign of American imperialism, 
but when Sweden exports IKEA in the rest of the world including the USA, this is not seen as Swedish 
imperialism, because it is not seen at all by this literature, let alone debated… Finally, because this 
literature is most of the time critical of the USA’s foreign policy one can also say that it is to a large 
extend a normative theory. The concept of empire of the third generation (“Empire 3G”) presented in 
this article is not related to New Imperialism at all. It is embedded in political science, it focusses on 
polities and polity building, and it is not normative. 
I have previously argued (2008, 2011), that the EU is not an empire. Not so much because it not one as 
because it has not stabilized yet. Therefore, it is not an international organization either, nor is it a 
federation. It doesn’t help either that the EU refuses to commit to any label except that of a sui generis 
“thing” and of an “ever closer union”. Because of this, trying to label the EU has proven unsuccessful and 
blocked attempts to reflect on its “nature”. I find it more helpful to reason in terms of process and from 
there I consider that the European integration process has evolved in a way which we can analyze as a 
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process of imperialization – even if not exclusively (Gravier, 2011). But in this article, I wish to bring the 
discussion one step forward: my main argument will be to say that if the EU is to be considered an 
empire (or undergoing a process of imperialization), than it can only be an empire 3G. 
 
The concept of Empire 3G reflects the attempt to conceive of a new model of empire which applies to 
the European Union. In this respect, this article belongs to a strand of literature reflecting on the use of 
empire within the context of the EU (Zielonka 2006, Beck and Grande 2004, Colomer 2007, 2011, Haldén 
2010; 2011, Gravier 2009, 2011). But the concept is open to potential other cases of regional 
integration. It is loosely inspired by an essay written in 1907 by the German historian Otto Hintze who 
distinguished two types of empires (or ‘imperialisms’ – If I am to respect his vocabulary): what he called 
old type imperialism and new type imperialism. His essay is in many ways dated and may even seem 
useless in the eyes of scholars of the 21st century. But it also develops an idea which is interesting for my 
purpose. Hintze observed a change between empires that existed before his time and the ones he 
witnessed at the beginning of the 20th century. While both types of empire were conceived of as 
systems of rule and domination, old empires were characterized by the will of polities or political groups 
to dominate each other. As if they were setting forth the Roman conception of empire, each polity or 
political group which created an empire tried to exert its domination on its neighbouring territories and 
expanded as much as it could using various instruments ranging from force, to diplomacy or marriage 
policies in the attempt to become the only power “in the world” since there could be only one emperor. 
The so-called colonial empires, and here Hintze focuses suddenly very much on European empires, differ 
from this conception of empire in that European states which created empires did not try to control 
their neighbours but rather exported their desire for supranational domination to non-European 
territories. Thus, all major European states could have their own empire. European states did not care 
fighting anymore for imperial exclusivity. It is as if they had preferred agreeing on splitting the world 
among themselves so that all of them could have an empire at a time. This also meant that European 
empires no longer focused on Europe but on the rest of the world. In this paper, I will argue that the 
integration project initiated in the early 50’s which led to the EU as we know it today reflects a new 
change in European supranationalism, which I call empire of the third generation since it comes after 
the two types identified by Hintze.  
(add  here the outline of the paper) 
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Some methodological remarks 
Part of the literature in political science on empires tries to build typologies opposing empires to other 
types of polities like states, federations, confederations, etc. (Gravier 2011, Colomer 2007                                              
), or types of political regimes like republic (Haldén, 2011) or types of international orders (Nexon, 
Parker). A few authors try to elaborate typologies distinguishing different types of empires (Zielonka). In 
this article, I use empire as a concept for the analysis and the comparison of a particular type of political 
systems and I propose a typology of European empires which distinguishes three generations of empire. 
Even though the notion of generation seems to indicate a genetic approach (see figure 1) these 
generations are not conceived of as necessary stages but as types which happen to have appeared 
successively in the European context. In other words, if – as will be suggested later – specific historical 
events explain the particular sequence in which Empires 1G, 2G and 3G appeared in Europe, what parts 
the three types of empires are characteristics which could be present in various historical contexts. 
Therefore, the three generations are in fact part of a typology (see figure 2): Empire 3G could appear 
elsewhere without having been preceded by Empire 2G or Empire 2G without having been preceded by 
Empire 1G. 
 
 
 
 
 
To readers of International Relations, a typology of European Empires may seem to lack ambition. A 
significant part of IR literature on empires likes to mention all empires of all times to give more weight 
to their theoretical framework. But I am a scholar of comparative politics and of Sartorian tradition. In 
this tradition, one is sensitive to the fact that increasing the number of cases (extension) necessarily 
comes at the expenses of the explanatory capacity (intension) of a comparison. Scholars of comparative 
politics are also sensitive to the fact that concepts do not travel well – neither in space nor in time. The 
Empire 
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Empires 
Empires 1G Empires 2G Empires 3G 
Figure 1: Genetic model Figure 2: Typology 
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quest for a universal theory of empires may be tempting, but it might also explain why “empirologist” 
have never been able to suggest theories accepted by all, let alone a definition of what empires are. 
Bearing these points in mind, this article has a more modest ambition. It compares a limited number of 
cases belonging to one region of the world in order to increase the explanatory capacity of the typology 
elaborated. 
 
Empires 1G and 2G: Hinzte’s theory of imperialism revisited 
In 1907, the German historian Otto Hintze wrote an essay on imperialism and world politics1. The world 
has very much changed since then and it would be unthinkable to write this essay today. His essay is 
very much marked by the optimistic spirit of the early 20th century. This is a time where none of the two 
World Wars had happened and where the Germans could not imagine that three decades later their 
state would plan a level of destruction of humanity that still cannot be fathomed today. 1907 belongs to 
a happy era which the French call the “Belle Époque” (the “beautiful Era”). Europeans and Americans 
were full of hope in the future; they were convinced of the superiority of their culture and technology. 
Hintze obviously shared this belief when he distinguished between “big powers” (Grossmächte) and 
“second and third row states” (Staaten zweiten und dritten Ranges). Hintze’s world was of course 
dominated by the United Kingdom and the USA but he wanted to raise Germany among the “big 
powers”. This is probably why he argued that there was without doubt “a certain community of culture 
and interest” among several big powers (in other words, including Germany) “against the still 
uncultivated part of humanity”. Hintze observed that these big powers all developed their own empires 
but he deemed important to add that “the goal of German ‘world politics’ is not the aspiration for world 
domination, but the aspiration to keep the balance of power in the international system 
(Weltstaatensystem) of the future” (p. 468-469). Seen from today, much of Hinzte’s argumentation in 
this text is as normative as outdated and cannot be used for the scientific value it might once have had. 
Historical facts are what they are and we know Hintze was wrong on Germany’s ‘world politics’. But 
other parts of this text, where the historian writes, not historical actor, are of interest, precisely 
because he was an eye witness of the last European empires and had a historical knowledge of how 
they functioned that has gone lost in much of today’s empirology. In particular, Hintze sketches a 
typology of empires (or imperialism in his vocabulary) that I find inspiring and use as a basis for my own 
typology of “generations” of empire. Hintze opposes two types of empires, those belonging to the 
                                                          
1
 “Imperialismus und Weltpolitik”, in Gerhard Oestreich (ed.), Otto Hintze. Staat und Verfassung. Gesammelte 
Abhandlungen zur Allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970, p. 457-469. 
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category “old imperialism” and those belonging to the category “new imperialism” (which he also calls 
“world politics” – hence the title of his text). The major difference between these two types of 
imperialisms relates to the ideology of the empire: old imperialism tried to create “universal empires” 
or “world empires” (Weltreiche) in other words empires that did not tolerate rivals, while new 
imperialism tried to create several “world empires” that existed next to one another. (p. 469). So 
imperial ideology is both a driving force of imperialism (in the sense of empire-building) and a 
characteristic according to which Hintze develops his typology. When it comes to the selection of cases, 
Hintze is not explicit. If he mentions here and there empires of different eras and of different parts of 
the world, his more detailed analyses concern European empires – the ones he probably knows best. 
Since my paper explores the potential imperial dimension of the EU, I will limit my analysis to Europe. 
Given this territorial delineation, Hintze’s typology corresponds roughly to an opposition between on 
the one hand what I would call the “Roman Empires” and on the other the empires of the 19th/20th 
century, with a transitory period between the 16th and 18th century. Maybe, as Hinzte contends, does 
the Napoleonic Empire, created in the early 19th century, mark the juncture between the two types. In 
this article, the expression “Roman Empire” refers to one precise empire, the one which collapsed in the 
5th century – there is no ambiguity here. I also use the expression “Roman Empires”, in the plural form, 
to cover all the empires that called themselves “Roman” following the doctrine of the translatio imperii 
(see below). In other words, the expression encompasses the “original” Roman Empire, and its 
successors like the Byzantine Empire (or “Eastern Roman Empire”) and the Holy Roman Empire. We 
could also add Charlemagne’s Empire after 800, when the King of the Franks became Emperor of the 
Romans – imperator romanorum. The translatio imperii was doctrine which was used by medieval 
lawyers to legitimate a newly founded empire by saying that the “empire”, as a political principle, had 
been passed on from the old empire to the new empire2. In other words, the newly founded empire 
was a continuation of the previous one. Therefore, the adjective “Roman” no longer meant that the 
Empire was in Rome or ruled the people of Rome. “Roman” became an adjective relating to the Roman 
tradition of empire. It referred to a specific culture and in particular, a specific institutional, political and 
legal legacy, which evolved and faded away with each new “transfer” of the empire, even if the label 
“Roman” was kept as a tool of legitimacy. Constantinople was thus called the “Second Rome” and after 
the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, Czar Ivan III who had married the niece of the last Byzantine 
                                                          
2
 In Latin, translatio means to transport, to transfer, to transplant. 
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emperor started to call Moscow the “Third Rome”3 (or the “New Rome”), even if the Holy Roman 
Empire had long claimed its “Romanness” – long before the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire, leading to 
the complicated coexistence of two competing Roman empires. 
One of the important aspects of the ideology of the Roman Empire was its ambition to be a universal 
empire and hence the sole empire ruling the world – what Hinzte callsed “Weltreich”. But even Hinzte 
noted that this claim was a mere claim and that in reality, this was a very relative notion, since other 
empires existed in other parts of the globe. But what is important is the idea of imperial exclusivity. This 
meant that according to the ideology of the empire there could be only one empire and one emperor. 
For instance, from the point of view of the Byzantine basileus other rulers claiming to be called emperor 
were considered usurping the title, even if in everyday diplomacy, the basileus was well aware that in 
the Western part of Europe, there were other rulers claiming to be Roman emperors (first Charlemagne 
in 800 and from 962 on the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire) (Bréhier, 1970). But the notion of 
imperial exclusivity, so important in the Roman tradition, disappears progressively from the imperial 
ideology of the successive empires, which I suggest to call “post-Roman” empires, in other words, 
European empires which do not claim the Roman heritage anymore and which do not use the label 
Roman in their name either. Hinzte’s suggests convincingly that this political evolution is linked to the 
state building process that occurd in Europe somewhere in the 16th/17th century. For him, the 
emergence of a “system of states” (Staatensystem) in Europe comes along with the principle of mutual 
recognition among these states. While the principle of imperial exclusivity of the Roman Empire meant 
that empires did not recognize the legitimacy of other empires, the emerging European system of states 
is composed of political entities which might disagree on the exact location of their borders but do not 
deny the legitimacy of the existence of other similar entities – their sovereignty if one wills. The 
emerging system of states is indeed a system among “equals”. Very importantly for my purpose, Hinzte 
suggested that this evolution had an impact on the empires created during this same period. In a 
nutshell, the emerging European (nation) states kept their interest in creating “supranational” units (or 
“composite” if supranational is too anachronistic) but progressively changed their empire building 
strategy to adapt to the reality of the new system of state. In other words, the corollary of recognizing 
the legitimacy of the others European states, lead to the fact that European states progressively 
stopped organizing empires in order to exert domination over their immediate neighbours and instead 
exported their imperial strategy outside of Europe. It is as if the European states agreed on dividing the 
                                                          
3
 For the sake of clarity, I will just mention in a foot note that, in fact, before Czar Ivan III, other kings related to the 
ruling dynasty of Byzantium claimed to be the perpetuators of the Byzantine Empire and their city to be the New 
Constantinople… 
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rest of the world among themselves, so that each European state which was powerful enough could 
have its own empire siding with the empires of other European states. The typology distinguishing 
empires by land (e.g.: ancient empires) and empires by sea (essentially the so-called “colonial empires”) 
probably tried to capture this transformation but it never really worked because the characteristic that 
distinguishes the two types of empire is not territory: in reality, many empires are by land and by sea at 
a time. 
While it is difficult to pinpoint what exactly is the difference between these two generations of empires, 
or which set of characteristics can help conceptualize the difference between them, there is an 
agreement over the fact that a change progressively occurred in the world of empires. Hinzte’s idea to 
link this transformation to the emergence of the state system is convincing. For him the Napoleonic 
Empire (1804-1814) marks best this transformation. Napoleon was still somehow inspired by the Roman 
Empire and he did try to gain control over Europe but, for Hinzte, Napoleon did not try to create a 
“world empire” similar to the Roman Empire because this would have meant a dissolution of the French 
nation and of all other European nations in one big political unit which was no longer possible at that 
time (Hintze, 1970, p. 465-466). From here, we can refine Hintze’s analysis and suggest that the 
historical rupture was not complete before the later phase of the emergence of the European system of 
states, when these evolved towards nation states, because the notion of nation brought in a different 
understanding of the political unit. If we go back to the first French Empire with this in mind, we see 
that this evolution is very well reflected in the symbols chosen by the Emperor of the French: while the 
eagle reminds many readers of Rome it is also a symbol of Charlemagne, who was of course a Roman 
emperor but whom the French above all consider to be one of the fathers of the French nation. Next to 
the eagle, Napoleon also used bees and fleur de lys leading back to the Merovingians (bees) and the 
Capetian dynasty (fleur de lys). In other words, Napopleon’s Empire had its foundation in the French 
nation not in the Roman tradition. It sought its legitimacy in its young national roots not through the 
translatio imperii. As a matter of fact, Hintze saw Napoleon’s empire as a “big federal world system” 
(ein grosses föderatives System der Welt) and the French nation state as its dominating center and 
legislator. European empires that remained or were created after the collapse of Napoleon’s Empire 
(until the IIId Reich) belong the second generation: they do not focus on dominating Europe anymore, 
their core is a European state and their strategies of territorial expansion are oriented towards the 
world outside of Europe. This is the reason why the post-Roman empires are called “colonial empires”.  
Like all periods of transition, the period between the first generation of European empires and the 
second generation is difficult to grasp. It is likely that the feudalization of Europe played an important 
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role in the end of the Roman empires. At least, the feudalization of the Byzantine Empire is said to have 
been one of the causes of its collapse in that it weakened the internal structure of the Empire, which 
was then unable to resist to external pressures (Bréhier, 1970). However, the feudalization of Europe 
doesn’t seem to have had an impact on the territorial policy of empires and it didn’t necessarily change 
the ideology of the empires, that’s why I would say that empires of this period still belong to the first 
generation of empires, but it had a significant impact on the organization of the center of power. The 
first two empires were organized around cities (Rome and Constantinople) while the next empires, 
already in the feudal era, were organized around dynasties (e.g.: the Carolingian, the Hohenstaufen, the 
Habsburg – let us here recall that the Holy Roman Empire never had a fixed capital). But both types of 
empires still claimed to control more or less contiguous chunks of the Mediteranean/European area and 
held their legitimacy from Rome either because they called themselves a Roman empire or because 
their emperor called himself/herself a Roman Emperor/Empress. The second generation of empires is 
different: these empires were organized around a state, their legitimacy was no longer in their Roman 
heritage, but in the roots of the core state and they expanded exclusively outside of Europe. The 
phrasing is worth noting here: some states already had overseas colonies before they became an 
empire. In other words, some states had an empire before they were an empire – to phrase it in the 
words of Maier (2006). For instance, the first French overseas colonies date back to the first half of the 
16th century, while the first French “Empire” was created in 1804. So the difference between the first 
and second generation of empires is not the possession of overseas colonies or not, but whether the 
Empire was still expanding inside Europe in the attempt to put all of Europe under one roof or the 
Empire’s peripheries were more or less (but rather more than less) exclusively outside of Europe. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Empires 1G and Empires 2G 
 Empires 1G 
- “Roman empires” - 
Empires 2G 
- Colonial empires - 
Legitimacy Rome and translation imperii Own national history 
Ideology Exclusivity Plurality 
Core City and then Dynasty State 
Territory Europe / South Europe + 
Mediterranean area 
Outside of Europe 
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To sum up, an evolution took place in the way European empires were created and organized. This 
evolution affected various aspects of the empires as can be seen in table 1: their legitimacy, their 
ideology, their core and their territory. A combination of these four characteristics helped me suggest 
the existence of two types or “generations” (since they appear in a historical sequence) of empires. But 
tackling European imperial history does not just reveal an evolution of empires, it also reveals one 
constant in the history of the European continent which is the ongoing attempt to create 
“supranational” or “composite” polities. The political and institutional recipe evolved over time, but the 
fundamental idea of big composite multicultural systems of governance was always there ever since the 
path breaking Roman experience and Europe has remained on this path since then. In other words, the 
European trajectory is characterized by a path dependence on “big composite multicultural systems of 
governance”. From this point of view, today’s European integration project appears a mere 
continuation of this path… with another recipe. I call it the “Empire of the third generation” or Empire 
3G. 
 
What is Empire 3G?  
Just like the evolution from Empire 1G to Empire 2G reflected a series of political, institutional and 
ideological transformations, so does the evolution from Empire 2G to Empire 3G. Two major events or 
sets of events happened around and slightly after the birth of the new European integration project. 
First of all World War II, which almost destroyed Europe and was powerful a catalyst enough to force it 
to reinvent itself. Second decolonization, initiated by the colonies which fought for their freedom, 
deprived the European states from their territorial overreach. One should add a third element which 
was more a process than an event: the progression of democracy. According to Huntington (1991), 
democracy was established and consolidated in Western European countries during the first two waves 
of democratization and many of the former European colonies democratized during the third wave of 
democratization, in other words, more or less at the same time as decolonization. I would like to 
suggest in the following section that, all together, these elements (World War II, decolonization and 
democratization) created a context where Empires 2G could not be envisaged anymore and which 
paved the way for Empire 3G. In a way, like Empires 1G had not survived the statist-national revolution, 
Empires 2G did not survive the democratic revolution. But democratization alone was not enough to 
explain a move towards Empire 3G in Europe: World War II acted as a catalytic event (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Empires 1G, 2G and 3G. 
 
What characterizes European Empire 3G or a move towards it is a set of three elements: supranational 
path dependence, a switch back to focusing on Europe as a territorial basis, the invention of a new type 
of “imperial core”. As already expressed earlier, if we consider the past 2000 years of history on the 
European continent, one can say that the formation of composite or supranational polities has been the 
norm in Europe. This path of “supranationalism” can be traced back at least to the Roman Empire. It is 
worth reminding that European empires did not disappear during the long period of formation of the 
European states, not even during the emergence of the nation states. Some contend that the empire 
building and the state building processes not only went hand in hand, but that the first one contributed 
to the second one (Ref???). Even the experience of the III Reich was not enough to shift Europe away 
from is supranational path dependence, quite the opposite: the creation of the ECSC was presented as 
an instrument meant to prevent war between European nations, in particular France and Germany 
(Schuman Declaration, 1950). But while supranational or composite experiments developed in various 
configurations century after century, none of these experiments ever reached a full political integration, 
in other words the creation of a unified European state, let alone nation. Europe never had a fully 
integrated political structure and never reached cultural unification. The linguistic diversity which still 
exists in Europe is a very good illustration of this: some 60 languages are still spoken today in Europe 
(Gravier and Lundquist, 2011). From this point of view, European empires have offered an in between 
situation where there was always more than a disorganized coterie of isolated political units next to one 
another, but always less than an integrated polity spreading over a whole region (like the USA, China, 
India, or Russia). European empires have offered some level of regional integration enabling some kind 
of circulation of goods, wealth, culture and people. They maintained more or less efficiently peace 
within their borders without absorbing the constitutive units, which continued to exist separately 
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sometimes only as distinct cultural units within a homogenous political structure, sometimes also as 
distinct political sub-units. However, the repeated experiences of belonging to the same supranational 
experiments lead to the progressive development a common meta-framework, which offered a solid 
basis for the creation of the European communities, despite what Eurosceptics contend a bit too 
quickly. This framework comprises broad religious, moral and political principles but also more specific 
and technical institutions. A good example of this is the fairly quick agreement between the founding 
member states when it came to the creation of the ECSC’s civil service, and later the extension of this 
civil service to the two other communities. The founding states shared a similar type of civil service 
(career civil service) and a similar legal system (inherited from the Roman experience), therefore they 
could fairly easily agree on a similar type of civil service at the EC/EU level. To sum up, the political 
history of the European continent has been characterized by a particular path dependence which is 
both supranational and only partly-integrated (i.e.: empires as opposed to a fully integrated state). 
From this point of view, the creation of the European Communities in 1951 and 1957 and their constant 
deepening into today’s configuration – the EU – appears as a continuation of the same path of 
supranationalism.  
A sub-section on legitimacy is still missing!!! 
Things start changing when it comes to territory. Given the experience of National Socialism and World 
War II, some of the West European states felt the need to modify the territorial focus of their foreign 
policy and refocus on their own continent. Much needed to be reconstructed and repaired, and a 
solution needed to be found to prevent war from happening again. In particular, France’s and 
Germany’s belligerent behaviours needed to be kept under control and creating a European 
superstructure appeared as the only solution to this problem. This is also the reason why the first 
European Community was dedicated to Steel and Coal: back in those days, these two industries were 
key warfare industries. Putting them under the control of a sovereign supranational institution was 
expected to make war impossible – as is stated explicitly in the Schuman Declaration. Combined with 
the impulse coming from the colonies which lead to decolonization, in other words the collapse of the 
Empires 2G, this strategy led back after a few decades to what characterized Empires 1G: uniting 
Europe in one political structure. One may argue that overseas territories still exist (Colomer, 2011), but 
they do not characterize the territorial strategy of today’s EU, they are only residual aspects of Empires 
2G of some individual member states. Further, and probably for the first time in European history, 
today’s supranationalism is explicitly limited to Europe by the Treaties. Article 49 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU) indeed states that only European states may become Member States. This leaves 
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open the question of the ultimate borders of Europe, of course, but given the geography of the 
continent, this only applies to the Eastern border. Since Article 2 of the same treaty states that to 
become a member state a state must share the values of the EU, we can conclude that only European 
states can become part of the EU but not all European states can at any time become a member. Being 
European is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. Still, Article 49 has implication regarding the 
characteristics of the EU’s empirehood. It is commonly agreed that empires are characterized by 
territorial openness and I have already argued that this is a major characteristic of empires (Gravier 
2011). If empires are characterized by open borders, and given that Article 49 of the TEU implies that 
the EU has at least in theory maximal borders (i.e.: “Europe”) one may ask what would happen if all 
possible member states indeed became member states. If, one day, the EU were to have integrated all 
possible member states, it would not be able to expand anymore therefore one could argue that it 
would not qualify for empirehood anymore. But one could also argue that since Article 50 of the TEU 
allows a Member State to leave the EU (and to reenter it again), in theory, the territory would still 
remain open, but only for shrinkage. So it would still qualify for empirehood. However, if it stabilized in 
its full size without losing territorial units, one could start raising the issue of a transformation of the EU, 
maybe towards a federal polity. To sum up on this sub-section on territory, as opposed to Empires 2G 
which expanded outside the European territory, the EU as an Empire 3G goes back to a territory limited 
to the European continent. From this point of view, Empire 3G resembles Empire 1G. In the words of 
Charles Maier, European imperialism evolved from being an empire (Empires 1G) to having an empire 
(Empires 2G) back to being an empire again (Empire 3G). This also explains why the EU still isn’t very 
powerful when it comes to its external action and to waging war outside its borders: this is not its 
original mission. Its original mission was to take care of its “continental self” and in particular to provide 
peace and wealth to its members. The idea that the EU should “speak with one voice” with the outer 
world or that it should be able to engage in military actions with whichever goals is the result of a more 
recent evolution, which has forced the EU to become something else for which it was not and still isn’t 
well equipped (despite the new external action service). But this doesn’t necessarily affect the EU’s 
empirehood: the Holy Roman emperor didn’t have an imperial army at its disposal, Byzantium’s military 
capacity didn’t compare with the Roman military capacity (Luttwak, 2010), which explains why it relied 
so much on its diplomacy (Luttwak 2010, Bréhier, 1970) and why it was more active in defensive wars 
than in offensive wars. 
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The issue of the imperial core is where Empire 3G differs most from Empires 1G and 2G. When Europe 
abandoned the path of Empire 1G in the wake of the emergence of a European system of states and of 
the national revolution, this was more or less the end of the idea that one European state could 
dominate the other states. The evolution away from Empire 2G meant that European states couldn’t 
continue dominating states outside of Europe either – democracies do not do that to each other. So it 
would be difficult to imagine a new form of European imperialism which would not take these 
evolutions into account. The conundrum solved in the Empire 3G recipe consisted in finding a way to 
create a core above all member states (that’s where we can start using the concept of empire) but a 
core which would not be under the control of one member state, since this solution had been 
progressively rejected. The creative solution of the European integration project has been to create a 
core which is an institutional and political stratum above each of the individual member states but 
controlled by all member states collectively. It is not important for the EU’s empirehood – or Empire 3G 
– that it is not built around a state: only Empires 2G were created around a state. Empires 1G were 
created around a city (Rome, Constantinople) or later, in the feudal era, around a person or a dynasty. It 
doesn’t matter either for the EU’s empirehood – or Empire 3G – that it doesn’t have a single capital. 
With three fixed capitals (Brussels, Luxemburg and Strasburg), which might one day converge towards 
one single capital (Brussels), it is better equipped than the Holy Roman Empire. What matters is the 
capacity of the core over the member states and the relations between the core and the individual 
member states.  
The issue of the capacity of the core is where one can discuss the EU’s empirehood in other words 
whether the EU is an Empire 3G or not. Pros and cons are probably equally acceptable: whether the 
glass is half empty or half full is often a question of attitude. Based on the historical evolution towards 
more integration (of course in a not-linear process and with backlashes and moments where things are 
stalled), I tend to see a glass which is filling itself. I do not know if it will ever be full – scientists cannot 
predict the future – but I observe an incredible transformation from the early and hesitant days in the 
early 50s and today’s EU. In others words, for the moment, and on the basis of historical facts, I think it 
is sustainable to say that a process of imperialization is taking place. But if I speak of imperialization, it is 
only along the lines of Empire 3G – the EU is neither an Empire 1G nor an empire 2G. Due to the 
particularity of the core in the 3G type, one can raise the issue of a hybrid “imperial federation”: maybe 
Empire 3G is a hybrid between empire and federation. 
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The same goes for the relations between the core and the individual member states. One of the 
particularities of empires is that the relations between the core and the individual peripheries are very 
diverse, according to what each peripheral unit is able to negotiate with the core (Nexon, 2008). 
“Negotiate” is here important: opposite to what too many scholars of International Relations contend 
too quickly, empires didn’t just imposed untenable conditions to their peripheries. This may be a major 
part of the relations between cores and peripheries in Empires 2G. But it was not so in Empires 1G 
where some peripheries had indeed no choice (those defeated by the core and absorbed without a say), 
but many other peripheries negotiated the terms of their participation in the empire (those which 
entered freely in the empire and which provided it with military capacity to protect the frontier, or 
those which had wealth and could lend money to the empire, or deliver important goods for the 
internal commerce, etc.). In other words, in the world of empires, some peripheries are imposed a 
bitter imperial menu while others experience a much more tasty empire à la carte. If we bear this in 
mind when observing the EU, we see a slow and hesitant, maybe even disappointed and reluctant move 
from the hope for fairly uniform conditions to all member states (the last attempt may have been the 
establishment of the so-called Copenhagen criteria) to admitting a Europe à la carte. What is essential 
in this evolution is the acceptance of the idea that Europe à la carte is maybe not a failure of the 
integration project, but the only solution to keep so many different member states within the same 
political composite unit. So what has changed is not just that there is more cherry-picking in the 
membership than before. In a sense member states always cherry-picked their membership. What has 
changed is the acceptance of this fact; the fact that cherry-picking is no longer seen as a pathological 
phenomenon. A certain normalization of Europe à la carte can be seen in the institutionalization of 
what is called enhanced cooperation since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997 – check!). Following Nexon 
analysis of empires (2008), this evolution where it is accepted that peripheral units (the member states) 
can negotiate different formulas of membership can be analyzed as a sign of imperialization. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that a new form of empire may have appeared or rather is being invented. I have 
called it Empire 3G to distinguish it from two previous historical forms of empire (see table 2). I also 
contend that if the EU is to be considered an empire, than it can only be an Empire 3G – it is obviously 
not an Empire 2G let alone an empire 1G. 
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Table 2: Comparison between the three generations of European empires: 
 Empires 1G 
- “Roman empires” - 
Empires 2G 
- Colonial empires - 
Empire 3G 
Legitimacy Rome and translation 
imperii 
Own national history Own regional history and a 
set of values 
Ideology Exclusivity Plurality Plurality 
Core City and then Dynasty State A supranational 
institutional stratum 
Territory Europe / South Europe + 
Mediterranean area 
Outside of Europe Europe 
Examples Roman Empire, Byzantine 
Empire, Carolingian empire, 
Holy Roman empire, 
Habsburg Empire 
Spanish Empire, 
British Empire, First French 
Empires, Dutch Empire 
One example up to now: 
the EU 
 
Why is the concept of empire 3G relevant? Because this helps show that opposite to what political 
actors and, with them, too many scholars contend much too quickly, the EU is not a just sui generis 
“thing”. Europe has experienced empires almost non-stop since at least the Roman Empire. Said 
otherwise, ever since the Roman Empire, Europe has remained on a path of supranationalism. This path 
has taken a few smooth turns (Empire 1G, feudal Empires 1G, Empires 2G), but even the traumatizing 
experience of the III Reich was not enough to produce a shift away from supranationalism. Quite the 
opposite since the only solution which was found to protect Europe from it and the terrible destruction 
it lead to was again another supranational experiment. From this point of view, the EU is the product of 
a longstanding path dependence in Europe which pushes political units to unite loosely in a political 
structure. Each historical era has come with different challenges and therefore with different 
supranational recipes but the path of supranationalism has neither been invented by the EC/EU, nor 
abandoned by it; it has just been reinvented by it. Further, opposite to what some political leaders 
contend about European nations, national histories, and national identities, the history of the European 
continent reveals that European populations share a long and complicated history which hasn’t just 
created national differences but also common references. 
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Empire 3G also bears the idea that despite what Empire 1G contented, empires were never really world 
empires [Weltreich, as Hinzte phrased it] but solutions for regional integration. In this respect, if the EU 
and its leaders are inventing Empire 3G, this solution could be used as an inspiration in other regions of 
the world in need of respect for differences but also of pacification and cooperation. As an inspiration 
but not a model: institutions are embedded in history therefore they can never be copied identically 
elsewhere.  
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